Digital Noise-What Place, What value?
This symposium took place at the Stephen Lawrence Gallery in relation to current exhibition. The issues of noise in a digital environment were the theme discussed in both situations. The exhibition brings a body of work all processed by a miss understanding in a communication field.
In the symposium, Jonathan Kearney, brought the history of the interpretation of the idea of noise. When we hear about noise normally, in a common sense, we identify as a bad sound or interference of some communication that went wrong. The noise comes as an error and a mistake, something to annulated and correct. In other hand in the in the 40s a man named Claude Shannon came up with the interpretation that a noise in a process of communication represents the world itself getting interferer with it. A new vision understands noise as an external ad as integrating the world environment to participate in the process. Jonathan in is own research brought the main question: is that the Noise the Human being? That question staid in my mind but not related to the Human but instead the attitude, the Free Will. Is it possible to consider the Noise as the Free will of a determinate system? Even in machinery environment?
This constitutes a turning point to recycle information and recover same expontaniety that has being lost in the ages of machinery perfection. A space to accept Free will. Henri Bergson (or even Kant in earlier times) already did initiate in the latest 19th century the interpretation of the beginning of acceptation of the free will and we can apply to as many environments as we want.
I bought this book in that symposium day at the University library shop.
“The problem which I have chosen is one which is common to metaphysics and psychology, the problem of free will. What I attempt to prove is that all discussion between the determinists and their opponents implies a previous confusion of duration with extensity, of succession with simultaneity, of quality with quantity: this confusion once dispelled, we may perhaps witness the disappearance of the objections raised against free will, of the definitions given of it, and, in a certain sense, of the problem of free will itself. To prove this is the object of the third part of the present volume: the first two chapters, which treat of the conceptions of intensity and duration, have been written as an introduction of the third.” February, 1888. H. Bergson